Short message multichannel broadcast encryption by Salazar, José Luis et al.
Short Message Multichannel Broadcast Encryption 
José Luis Salazar, Jose Saldana, Julián Fernández-Navajas, José Ruiz-Mas, Guillermo 
Azuara 
Departamento de Ingeniería y Comunicaciones. Universidad de Zaragoza 
{jsalazar, jsaldana, navajas, jruiz, gazuara}@unizar.es 
Abstract. The current use of short messages in wireless networks is highly grow-
ing. Messaging applications in mobile terminals with wireless coverage are very 
common in shopping, educational and transport centers, i.e. in centers of massive 
influx of people. This requires improving its efficiency, without losing security 
in such a hostile environment. In this paper, we propose an improvement in the 
use of the medium through a new multichannel broadcast encryption paradigm. 
Firstly, we rigorously demonstrate the security of our model that is characterized 
by two main issues: short messages and maintaining privacy in a shared frame. 
The improvements are obtained by reducing the transmitted overheads, saving 
bandwidth and airtime. To implement them, we improve the efficiency of com-
munications, reducing the security headers to a single one, which will be shared 
by all receivers, while the payload is multiplexed via Chinese Remainder Theo-
rem. In this way we reduce the packet length (less headers) and set the ratio of 
the encrypted text/plaintext equals to one, if we do not take into account padding 
and security headers. Although the model can be used by all types of networks, 
both wired and wireless, the improvement is more noticeable in the latter type. 
To make it remarkable, we quantify what this gain will consist of. 
Keywords: Multichannel Broadcast Encryption, Provable Security, Channel 
Utilization Efficiency. 
1 Introduction 
 The extended use of mobile services in the last decades has led to an increasing 
use of small packets [1], especially for certain services with tight interactivity con-
straints, e.g. VoIP or online games. In order to achieve this, small pieces of information 
(voice samples, game updates) have to be sent with a high frequency. Since each of 
these packets includes the headers imposed by the different protocol architecture layers, 
the inefficiency is stressed for these real-time services. 
 In this context, to find a good balance between the efficiency of communica-
tions and their security becomes a challenging issue, often influenced by the different 
service requirements. The problem becomes more relevant when physical constraints 
affect the Quality of Service (QoS), as it happens in wireless communications. 
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On the one hand, aA clear example of this inefficiency (useful data with respect to total 
transmitted bytes) can be found when sending small packets over 802.11: according to 
the definition of the MAC frame of the standard [2], the header plus the FCS is 40 octets 
long. Therefore, for a VoIP packet of 40 bytes, the efficiency is 50%. However, for big 
packets the problem is negligible because the payload may account for the vast majority 
of the frame size. In addition, the use of a shared medium requires some time for media 
access control mechanisms, which is another source of inefficiency. Nevertheless, there 
exist successful solutions aimed at addressing this problem, e.g. frame aggregation in 
802.11 [3]. Other solutions have been proposed in the literature for wired scenarios [4, 
5]. In addition, the use of broadcast packets is seen as a way to increase network effi-
ciency, especially in wireless scenarios [6]. 
On the other hand, security has a negative influence on efficiency also: the addition 
of security headers can increase the overhead in a significant way. Therefore, ap-
proaches that jointly address aggregation and security become very important: if a se-
cure header can cover a number of small packets, its overhead is amortized between 
them.  
In the present article we propose to improve the balance of security and efficiency 
for fixing the problem. We jointly aggregate several small encrypted packets, and 
broadcast them, assuring that each of the sub-packets can only be decrypted by a unique 
entity: its legitimate receiver. 
In any classic secure broadcast cable TV system (see Table 1, left column), a number 
of individualized headers ui (i.e. the ones required for building the user private key for 
decryption), are usually sent together in a single multiplexed frame. In addition, a com-
mon field Hdr is required, and finally the encrypted content of each user (ci) is ap-
pended. 
However, our proposal (Table 1, right column) consists of merging all the individual 
headers, jointly with Hdr, to obtain a single header Hdr’. This can reduce the total 
amount of information to be transmitted, providing real savings in terms of bandwidth. 
At the same time, only the legitimate recipient i of each packet will be able to decrypt 
the information ui, using Hdr’ and their own private key. 
Table 1. Comparison of encrypted information in classic models and our proposal. 
Classic Model Our proposal 
(u1, u2, …, un, Hdr, c1, c2, … , cn, ) (Hdr’, c1, c2, … , cn, ) 
Previous models for broadcasting encryption have been proposed [7], but they are 
mainly designed for access control in encrypted file systems [8, 9]. In an abstract view, 
access control in an encrypted file system can be seen as a broadcast encryption prob-
lem, where the file system is the broadcast channel, and the key is broadcast (via the 
file header) to the subset of users that can access a concrete file. Different security 
models in cloud storage have been recently proposed in research literature [10, 11, 12]. 
Our proposal combines the underlying scheme of broadcast encryption, but using 
more efficiently the spectrum: we propose to aggregate the encrypted packets following 
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the way of the Chinese Remainder Theorem, and to implement random encryption 
where the random seed is shared by all users. 
All in all, the specific contribution of the present paper is twofold: 
• The proposal of a new security scheme able to merge a number of individual head-
ers, resulting in a reduction of the total size of the information to be transmitted. 
• To apply our proposal to wireless networking (802.11) in order to increase its ef-
ficiency by the reduction of the amount of information that has to be sent through 
the wireless medium. We also provide an analysis of the tradeoff that appears: 
security level (in terms of key size) vs efficiency (in terms of channel utilization, 
i.e. achieved rate divided by nominal rate).  
In the next section (2) we describe the elements of a broadcast encryption system, 
together with the security model to be analyzed. In Section 3 we explain our proposal 
in two stages, for a better understanding: first, a basic description for a deterministic 
encryption and second, the subsequent introduction of randomness. Section 4 studies 
the balance of security and efficiency achieved, using IEEE 802.11. The paper ends 
(section 5) with the Conclusions. 
2 Broadcast Encryption 
2.1 Syntax 
In this section we will use the model for a multi-channel broadcast encryption system 
proposed in [14], and will adapt it for our specific issues. Formally, such a system con-
sists of four probabilistic algorithms: 
• Setup (λ): Takes as an input the parameter security λ, generates the global param-
eters param of the system, and returns the encryption secret key EK. 
• Extract (i, EK): Takes as an input the user’s index i, together with the encryption 
key, and outputs the user’s private keys (pi, xi). 
• Encrypt (u1, u2, …, un, m1, m2, … , mn, EK): Takes as an input the identifiers of n 
users (ui), n messages (one per user, mi) and the encryption key EK. It outputs (Hdr, 
ET) where Hdr is a random number for encryption/decryption, and ET is the en-
crypted text, computed with all plaintexts. 
• Decrypt (Hdr, ET, i, pi, xi): Takes as an input the random header Hdr, the encrypted 
text ET, the user’s index i, and their private keys pi and xi, and it outputs the 
cleartext for i, mi. 
For correctness, we require that for all i∈{1,…, n}, if EK ← Setup (λ), (pi, xi) ← Ex-
tract (i, EK) and (Hdr, ET) ← Encrypt (u1, u2, …, un, m1, m2, … , mn, EK), then mi ← 
Decrypt (Hdr, ET, i, pi, xi). 
2.2 Security Model 
We define the security model of a broadcast encryption system, adapted from [14], 
with the following game between an adversary 𝒜𝒜 and a challenger: 
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• Setup (λ): The challenger runs the setup algorithm for generating the global pa-
rameters param of the system, and returns the secret encryption key EK. Corrup-
tion and decryption lists ΛC, ΛD are set to empty lists. 
• Query phase 1: The adversary 𝒜𝒜 adaptively asks queries: 
─ Corruption query for the i-th user: the challenger runs Extract (i, EK) and for-
wards the resulting private keys (pi, xi) to 𝒜𝒜. The user ui is appended to the 
corruption list ΛC. 
─ Decryption query on (Hdr, ET, i). The challenger answers with Decrypt (Hdr, 
ET, i, pi, xi). (Hdr, ET, i) is appended to the decryption list ΛD. 
─ Encryption query for the target users. The challenger answers with Encrypt (u1, 
u2, …, un, m1, m2, … , mn, EK). 
• Challenge: The adversary 𝒜𝒜 defines an index j, which specifies the attacked user, 
uj. The challenger runs Encrypt (u1, u2, …, un, m1, m2, … , mn, EK) and gets (Hdr, 
ET), i.e., the encrypted component of the challenge. Next, the challenger picks a 
random 𝑏𝑏
$
← {0,1} and sets 𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏 = (Hdr, 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸). Moreover, it is defined the function: 
𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬: 𝑯𝑯𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝒆𝑬𝑬 × ℤ𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬 → 𝑹𝑹𝒆𝒆𝑬𝑬𝑹𝑹�𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝑬𝑬� 
(𝑯𝑯𝒆𝒆𝑬𝑬, 𝒛𝒛𝑬𝑬) → 𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝐄𝑬𝑬(𝒖𝒖𝟏𝟏,𝒖𝒖𝟐𝟐, … ,𝒖𝒖𝑬𝑬,𝒎𝒎� 𝟏𝟏,𝒎𝒎� 𝟐𝟐  … , 𝒛𝒛𝑬𝑬, … ,𝒎𝒎� 𝑬𝑬,𝑬𝑬𝑬𝑬) 
where 𝑚𝑚�𝑖𝑖 = 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖, used for computing cb. (Let us remember that Encrypt: (Encryptx, 





picked randomly and 𝑐𝑐1−𝑏𝑏 = (𝐻𝐻, 𝑅𝑅) is set, i.e., the random component. It then out-
puts (𝑐𝑐0, 𝑐𝑐1) to 𝒜𝒜. 
• Query phase 2: The adversary 𝒜𝒜 continues to adaptively ask queries as in the 
first phase. 
• Guess: The adversary 𝒜𝒜 eventually outputs its guess b’ ∈ {0, 1} for b. 
We say the adversary wins the game if b’ = b, but only if 𝑢𝑢𝑗𝑗 ∉ Λ𝐶𝐶 and 
(𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻, 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸, 𝐸𝐸) ∉ Λ𝐷𝐷. We then denote by 𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝒜𝒜) = 𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻[𝑏𝑏′ = 𝑏𝑏] the probability 
that 𝒜𝒜 wins the game, and its advantage is: 𝐴𝐴𝐻𝐻𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝒜𝒜) = 2 · 𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝒜𝒜) − 1 =
𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻[1 ← 𝒜𝒜|𝑏𝑏 = 1] − 𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻[1 ← 𝒜𝒜|𝑏𝑏 = 0]. 
Definition 1 (Full Security): A broadcast encryption scheme is said (t, ε, qC, qD, qE) – 
secure if for any t-time algorithm 𝒜𝒜 that makes at most qC corruption queries, qD de-
cryption queries and qE encryption queries, Advind(𝒜𝒜) ≤ negl(·), where negl(·) is a neg-
ligible function. We denote by Advind(t, ε, qC, qD, qE) the advantage of the best time t-
time adversary. 
There are two classical restricted scenarios: a selective attacker provides the target 
users at the security game, and one can also restrict the adversary not to ask some que-
ries. 
Definition 2 (Basic Selective Security): A broadcast encryption scheme is said (t, ε, 
qC) – selectively secure if it is (t, ε, qC, 0, 0) – secure against a selective adversary. We 
denote by Advb-ind(t, qC) the advantage of the best time t-time basic selective adversary. 
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Definition 3 (Strong Selective Security): A broadcast encryption scheme is said (t, ε, 
qC, qD, qE)– selectively secure if it is (t, ε, qC, qD, qE) – secure against a selective adver-
sary. We denote by Advs-ind(t, qC, qD, qE) the advantage of the best time t-time strong 
selective adversary. 
3 Proposed solutions 
In this section we first describe a proposal with basic security, for a better understanding 
of the process in general. We can realize that the security is only basic because it is a 
deterministic encryption. Then, a second proposal avoids that problem by using a ran-
dom parameter, strengthening the security. 
3.1 Basic security 
In this proposal we do not use the encryption header because the “noise” introduced by 
Chinese Remainder Theorem parameters is enough in order to hide the clear text.  
Description. Let us now formally describe our scheme for Short Message Basic Broad-
cast Encryption (SMBBE). We shall then prove its security. 
• Setup (λ): The algorithm takes as input the parameter security λ, it generates 
the global parameters param of the system as follows: first, the algorithm 
randomly picks n primes pi. Then it sets 𝑁𝑁 = ∏ 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1  and EK = (p1, p2, …, 
pn) where every prime of this set is the secret decryption key of each user. 
• Extract algorithm will then send the corresponding key to each user. 








(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖)�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 � (𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻 𝑁𝑁) . Its output is ET, the encrypted 
multiplexed text, computed with all plaintexts. 
• Decrypt (ET, i, pi): The algorithm computes 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 = 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖). This result 
is proved by the Chinese Remainder Theorem. 
Security. 
Theorem 1:. SMBBE is (t, ε, qC) – selectively secure. 
Proof:. We claim, without loss of generality for the proof [15], that ΛC={u1, 
u2,…,un}\{ui, uj}, where uj is the attacked user. The set of non-corrupted nodes must 




 . Since the output of the function Encrypt(u1, u2,…,un, m1, m2, … 
, mn, EK) is only an integer ET∈ ℤ𝑵𝑵 , then we adapt the challenge, being 𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏 = 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 , and 
𝑐𝑐1−𝑏𝑏 = 𝑅𝑅, where Encrypty(u1, u2,…,un, m1, m2, … , mn, EK) = Encrypt(mj). 
Since that function accomplishes all the Chinese Remainder Theorem’s require-
ments, then Encryptj is an injective function and also bijective in Rang(Encryptj). 
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Hence, if mj is a random variable, picked randomly in ℤ𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗, we can define another ran-
dom variable 𝐸𝐸:ℤ𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 → 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸)  with identical probability distribution, via 
Encryptj, i.e., 𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻[𝐸𝐸(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑧𝑧] = 𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻[𝑥𝑥 = 𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸−1(𝑧𝑧)]. Now, we can say that En-
cryptj is a pseudorandom function. Thus, 
�𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻 �𝐷𝐷 �𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸�𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗�� = 1� − 𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻�𝐷𝐷�𝐸𝐸(𝑥𝑥)�� = 1� ≤ 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛(𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖) (1) 
where D is a distinguisher function of randomness and negl is a negligible function. 
Now we assume that there exists an adversary 𝒜𝒜  that obtains a non-negligible ad-
vantage for the security model challenge. Then, 
|𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻[1 ← 𝒜𝒜|𝑏𝑏 = 1] − 𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻[1 ← 𝒜𝒜|𝑏𝑏 = 0]| > 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛(𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖)  (2) 
 But, |𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻[1 ← 𝒜𝒜|𝑏𝑏 = 1] − 𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻[1 ← 𝒜𝒜|𝑏𝑏 = 0]| = �𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻 �𝐷𝐷 �𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸�𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗�� = 1� −
𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻�𝐷𝐷�𝐸𝐸(𝑥𝑥)�� = 1� ≤ 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛(𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖), and this is contradictory with (2). Then, the adversary 
𝒜𝒜 does not exist. # 
3.2 Strong security 
We can easily realize that the basic security model works with a deterministic encryp-
tion, and therefore it will not resist an attack with chosen plaintext. To overcome this 
problem, we can improve it with a new paradigm embedding probabilistic encryption. 
Description. Let us now formally describe our construction for Short Message Strong 
Broadcast Encryption (SMSBE). We shall then prove its security: 
• Setup (λ): The algorithm takes as an input the security parameter λ. The global 
parameters param of the system are generated as follows: first, the algorithm ran-
domly picks n primes pi (one per user), and random 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ∈ ℤ𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
∗ , such that 
𝑅𝑅. 𝑐𝑐.𝐻𝐻. (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 , 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 − 1) = 1. Then it sets 𝑁𝑁 = ∏ 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1  and EK=((p1, x1), (p2, x2), …, 
(pn, xn)) where every pair of this set is the secret decryption key of each user that 
will be sent them by the Extract algorithm. 





∗  , 
and define Hdr𝑖𝑖 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑅𝑅�𝑅𝑅 ≥ Hdr 𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐ℎ 𝐸𝐸ℎ𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸 𝑅𝑅 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠 𝐻𝐻 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻 ℤ𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
∗ � then set 








(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖)�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖=1 � (𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻 𝑁𝑁) . It outputs 
(Hdr, ET). 
• Decrypt (Hdr, ET, i, pi, gi): This algorithm computes 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 = �𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 −
Hdr𝑖𝑖
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖�(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖). This result is proved by the Chinese Remainder Theorem. 
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Security. From the last description, it is easy to see that the attacks with chosen (no 
random) plaintext make useless the proof for the basic security. The inclusion of the 
random parameter Hdr in the protocol solves the problem. 
Theorem 2: SMSBE is (t, ε, qC, qD, qE) – selectively secure. 
Proof: We claim, without loss of generality for the proof [14], that ΛC = {u1, 
u2,…,un}\{uj}, where uj is the attacked user. Now, we only need the unique non-cor-
rupted node to be the attacked one, because the secret key xi is not revealed. Since the 
discrete logarithm assumption holds in ℤ𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
∗ , it cannot be computed from 
Hdr𝑖𝑖
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖  (𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖) by an eavesdropper.  
First, we define some variables for improving the understanding of the proof. Let us 
name 𝑞𝑞 = min
𝑗𝑗∈〈1,…,𝑖𝑖〉
𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗, and the function: 
𝑀𝑀:ℤ𝑞𝑞∗ × ℤ𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 → ℤ𝑞𝑞
∗ × ℤ𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 
(𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻, 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖) → �𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻, 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 + 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖� 
It is easy to see that M is a bijection, since 𝑀𝑀−1(ℎ, 𝑐𝑐) = �ℎ, 𝑐𝑐 − ℎ𝑖𝑖
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖  𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖�, 
where h𝑖𝑖 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑅𝑅�𝑅𝑅 ≥ h 𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐ℎ 𝐸𝐸ℎ𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸 𝑅𝑅 𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠 𝐻𝐻 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻 𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝐻𝐻 ℤ𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖
∗ �. 
Hence we consider Encryptj to be a random variable, defined in 2.2. Now, we can 
define another random variable 𝐸𝐸:ℤ𝑞𝑞∗ × ℤ𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 → 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅(𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸)  with identical prob-
ability distribution, via Encryptj, i.e., [𝐸𝐸(𝐻𝐻, 𝑥𝑥) = 𝑧𝑧] = 𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻[(𝐻𝐻, 𝑥𝑥)  =
𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸−1(𝑧𝑧)] . Now, we can say that it is a pseudorandom function. Thus, 
�𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻[𝐷𝐷(𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻, 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖) ) = 1] − 𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻�𝐷𝐷�𝐸𝐸(𝐻𝐻, 𝑥𝑥)� � = 1� ≤ 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛(𝑞𝑞,𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖) (3) 
where D is a distinguisher function of randomness and negl is a negligible function. 
Now, we assume that there exists an adversary 𝒜𝒜  that obtains a non-negligible ad-
vantage for the security model challenge. Then, 
|𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻[1 ← 𝒜𝒜|𝑏𝑏 = 1] − 𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻[1 ← 𝒜𝒜|𝑏𝑏 = 0]| > 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛(𝑞𝑞,𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖)  (4) 
But, |𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻[1 ← 𝒜𝒜|𝑏𝑏 = 1] − 𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻[1 ← 𝒜𝒜|𝑏𝑏 = 0]| =
�𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻�𝐷𝐷�𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝑢𝑢1,𝑢𝑢2, … ,𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑚𝑚1,𝑚𝑚2, … ,𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖, EK )� = 1� −
𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻[𝐷𝐷(𝐻𝐻, 𝐸𝐸(𝐻𝐻, 𝑥𝑥)) ] = 1� = �𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻[𝐷𝐷(𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑐𝑐𝐻𝐻𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻, 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖) ) = 1] −
𝑃𝑃𝐻𝐻�𝐷𝐷�𝐸𝐸(𝐻𝐻, 𝑥𝑥)� � = 1� ≤ 𝑅𝑅𝐻𝐻𝑅𝑅𝑛𝑛(𝑞𝑞,𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖), and this is contradictory with (4). Then, the 
adversary 𝒜𝒜 does not exist. # 
4 Security vs efficiency 
Once the proposed solutions have been presented in the previous section, in the present 
one we analytically study the efficiency tradeoff in a wireless scenario: the IEEE 802.11 
(WiFi) standard. 
Given the needs of communication of small packets in terms of security and effi-
ciency, the restrictions implied by the use of SMSBE mainly limit the size of the used 
keys. Our main objective is to find a balance between efficiency and security that are 
usually becoming antagonistic issues. 
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4.1 Bandwidth efficiency 
For making a quick balance, we will assume that our approach sends multicast 
frames including information for n users. We will also assume that users’ payload size 
is i <k bytes. In the standard method, the length of the whole encrypted text would be 
𝑅𝑅 �48 + 16 � 𝑖𝑖
16
��, since each of the n packets is built with a 40-byte MAC header and 
8-byte CCMP header. In our approach, we broadcast the same encrypted payload with 
k(n+1)+40 bytes. Rounding 16 � 𝑖𝑖
16
� ≈ 𝑚𝑚, then, our proposal will potentially be more ef-
ficient when n(48+i)>k(n+1)+40 bytes ⇒  𝑚𝑚 > 𝑘𝑘(𝑖𝑖+1)+40
𝑖𝑖
− 48 𝑏𝑏𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐻𝐻𝑠𝑠. 
 
Fig. 1. Delimiter of the areas for improvement of the proposal for IEEE 802.11. 
Therefore, our proposal is more efficient for 802.11, provided that user’s packets 
size has an upper bound. The savings will be optimal if the key size is only slightly 
higher than the packet size. Thus, in services that send packets of the same size (e.g. 
VoIP), an optimal key can easily be selected. In Fig. 1 we represent the delimiter of the 
areas for improvement of our proposal. It should be noted that efficiency is improved 
in the space above the curve. It can be observed that the minimum average size grows 
linearly with the level of security.  
4.2 Channel Utilization Efficiency 
When we analyze a wireless link, we must take into account not only the bandwidth 
(in terms of bytes sent), but it is also necessary to consider the mechanisms for medium 
access. If we have to wait for the medium to be free, then when we have to send a lot 
of packets through it, we will accumulate a lot of waiting time. Hence, sending a smaller 






























ones) can improve the spectrum utilization. The version 802.11n of the standard in-
cluded two aggregation mechanisms: A-MPDU (Aggregated Media Access Control 
Protocol Data Unit, that sends a number of MPDUs together, and A-MSDU (Aggre-
gated Media Access Control Service Data Unit), that makes the same at MSDU level 
[3]. The use of these aggregation mechanisms for sending multicast frames has been 
proposed in the literature [15, 16]. 
In Fig. 2 we compare our proposal of using secured multicast A-MSDU, versus the 
use of secured A-MPDUs, in terms of efficiency in the downlink. The size of each of 
the aggregated packets is determined by the size of the key: e.g. 128 bytes for the 1024 
bits key. Three different key sizes (1024, 2048 and 4096 bits) are used. Different num-
bers of UDP packets are aggregated (X axis).  
 
 Fig. 2. Channel utilization ratio with 1024, 2048 and 4096 bit-long average packet size  
We can see how the general efficiency grows when the number of aggregated pack-
ets or the bit-long average packet size is increased. It can be observed that in general, 
our proposal based on multicast A-MSDUs outperforms the one based on A-MPDUs. 
Only for the biggest key (4096 bits) it presents a lower performance if the number of 
users is below 13.  
5 Conclusions 
We have designed an efficient broadcast encryption system for traffic of small packets. 
We have used the Chinese Remainder Theorem to multiplex the encrypted messages 
and made unique the random source for encryption. The result improves the bandwidth 
saving and the air time connection when compared to encryption of multiple unicast 




















Number of aggregated packets
Efficiency
Secured A-MPDU 1024 bits
Secured A-MSDU 1024 bits Proposal
Secured A-MPDU 2048 bits
Secured A-MSDU 2048 bits Proposal
Secured A-MPDU 4096 bits
Secured A-MSDU 4096 bits Proposal
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